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Abstract
It was recently demonstrated that the Matrix Action Key Exchange
(MAKE) algorithm, a new type of key exchange protocol using the semidi-
rect product of matrix groups, is vulnerable to a linear algebraic attack
if the matrices are over a commutative ring. In this note, we establish
conditions under which protocols using matrices over a non-commutative
ring are also vulnerable to this attack. We then demonstrate that group
rings R[G] used in [1], where R is a commutative ring and G is a non-
abelian group, are examples of non-commutative rings that satisfy these
conditions.
1 Introduction
Since the advent of Shor’s algorithm it has been desirable to study alternatives
to the Diffie-Hellman key exchange [2]. One approach to this problem appeals
to a more complex group structure: recall that for (semi)groups G,H and a
homomorphism θ : H → Aut(G), the semidirect product of G by H with respect
to θ, G⋊θ H , is the set of ordered pairs G×H equipped with multiplication
(g, h)(g′, h′) = (θ(h′)(g)g′, hh′)
Recall also that the action of a group G on a finite set X is a function (G,X) →
X , here written as g ·x, is a function satisfying 1 ·x = x, and g · (h ·x) = (gh) ·x
for all g, h ∈ G. It turns out that such an action induces a homomorphism into
the group of permutations of X ; in particular, if G,H are groups, an action
of H on G specifies a homomorphism into the automorphism group of G, so
specifying such an action suffices to specify a semidirect product structure.
The semidirect product can be used to generalise the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange [1]; in a general protocol sometimes known as the “non-commutative
shift”. Originally, the semigroup of 3 × 3 matrices over the group ring Z7[A5]
is proposed as the platform; however, this turned out to be vulnerable to the
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type of attack (the so-called “dimension attack”) by linear algebra described
in [3],[4]. Other platforms used include tropical algebras [5] and free nilpotent
p-groups [6].
The insight of the recent MAKE protocol [7] is to use the ring formed by
square matrices over a ring. This object is a group under addition and a semi-
group under multiplication, so we can follow the syntax of [1] in such a way as
to mix operations so that no power of any matrix is ever exposed. However, the
protocol is vulnerable to another linear algebraic attack [8], which relies on the
commutativity of the underlying ring. The purpose of this note is to demon-
strate that under certain circumstances, using a non-commutative underlying
ring will have the same vulnerability. Moreover, these conditions are satisfied
by group rings of the form used in [1].
The authors of the MAKE protocol have since released a new protocol using
similar ideas; this time, the matrices are over the semiring of bitstrings equipped
with an arithmetic defined by Boolean operations [9]. In particular, there is no
notion of additive inverse in this context, and the known linear algebra attacks,
including the extended attack in this paper, do not seem to apply here.
2 Matrix Action Key Exchange (MAKE)
The following is taken from [7], following an original version in which H1 = H2.
For n ∈ N and p prime, consider the additive group G of n × n matrices




2) : i ∈ N} generated by
non-invertible matrices H1, H2 ∈ Mn(Zp). The action of S on G defined by
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We use this semidirect product structure in the syntax of [1] as follows. Suppose
Alice and Bob wish to agree on a shared, private key by communicating over
an insecure channel. Suppose also that public data M,H1, H2 is available.
1. Alice picks random x ∈ N and calculates (M, (H1, H2))
x = (A, (Hx1 , H
x
2 ))
and sends A to Bob.
2. Bob similarly calculates a value B corresponding to random y ∈ N, and
sends it to Alice.
1We rely on commutativity of S to satisfy the axioms of an action, which is why a cyclic
group is used.
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3. Alice calculates (B, ∗)(A, (Hx1 , H
x




2 + A, ∗∗) and arrives at




2 + A. She does not actually calculate the product
explicitly since she does not know the value of ∗; however, it is not required
to calculate the first component of the product.





























































Alice and Bob both arrive at the same shared key K = KA = KB.
Attacking the protocol directly requires recovering m,n from A,B. This
leads to a natural analogue of the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption;
namely, computational infeasability of retrieving the shared secret K given the
data (H1, H2,M,A,B)
2. Clearly, this is closely related to an analogue of the
discrete logarithm problem (DLP), which is shown in [7] to be at least as hard
as the standard DLP provided certain “safe” primes p are used.
3 Attack by Cayley-Hamilton
Several protocols following the non-commutative shift syntax are vulnerable to
the dimension attack, which does not require one to solve the problems ad-
dressed in the security assumption. This class of attacks, however, deal with
schemes using only group multiplication. In our case, we have two operations;
the following attack was developed by Brown, Koblitz and Legrow in [8] and is
roughly outlined below. Suppose the public data M,H1, H2 are fixed, as well
as transmitted values A,B corresponding to exponents x, y respectively.
Key to the following are the functions L : Mn(Zp) → Mn2(Zp), vec :
Mn2(Zp) → Z
n2
p , the Cayley-Hamilton theorem, and a “telescoping” property
inherent in the MAKE scheme. The function L is defined by specifying each
component of the n2 × n2 matrix, that is, for Y ∈Mn(Zp), set





2This is a weaker security notion than key indistinguishability, analogue of the decisional
Diffie-Hellman assumption; the authors of [7] conduct some computational experiments sug-
gesting the latter assumption may hold. This fact is not further referenced in this paper, since
the attack does not require solving the analogue of the discrete log problem.
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for 0 ≤ i, j, g, h ≤ n − 1 (note that the rows and columns of the matrices are
indexed by 0 to n− 1). Let vec by the bijection from n× n matrices to height
n2 column vectors obtained simply by stacking the columns of the matrix; one
can think of the hn+ gth column of L(Y ) as vec(Hg1Y H
h
2 ).
The Cayley-Hamilton theorem states that for any n ∈ N and commutative
ring R, every matrix A ∈Mn(R) satisfies its own characteristic polynomial. In
particular, a consequence of the theorem is the existence, for any A ∈ Mn(R),







Finally, we have that



















so the sum on the left hand side telescopes and leaves Hx1MH
x
2 . Moreover, all
the data on the left hand side is available to an attacker; the availability of the
quantity on the right hand side is essential for the construction of a system of
linear equations, a solution to which will allow us to recover the shared secret
key3.
Armed with these tools, the attack works as follows:
1. The Cayley-Hamilton theorem is used to construct a vector s such that
L(Y )s = vec(Hx1 Y H
x
2 )
for any Y ∈Mn(Zp).
2. It is shown that for l ∈ N, Y ∈ Mn(Zp), any u satisfying L(Y )u = 0 also
satisfies L(H l1Y H
l
2)u = 0.
3. A vector t is recovered by solving the n2 linear equations in n2 variables
defined by L(M)t = vec(Hx1MH
x
2 ).
4. The fact that L is a ring homomorphism and item 3 are used to show that
the vector t satisfies L(B)t = vec(Hx1BH
x





therefore the shared secret key K simply by adding A.
3This fact is exploited in [10], an earlier attack using similar ideas that relied on H1,H2
being invertible. We thank Chris Monico for his helpful correspondence on this subject.
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4 Attacking Non-Commutative Rings
A key part of the above attack is the construction of the vector s, which is done
by the Cayley-Hamilton theorem. In particular, this theorem only applies to
square matrices over commutative rings; so an obvious method of removing the
vulnerability to this attack is to use matrices over a non-commutative ring as the
platform. The purpose of this section is to show that under certain conditions,
this is not secure. In the following, let R be an arbitrary non-commutative ring.
Theorem 1. Suppose there is an injective ring homomorphism φ : R →Mm(S)
for some m ∈ N and a commutative ring S. For any m ∈ N define
ψ :Mn(R) →Mmn(S)
(ψ(A))im+g,jm+h = (φ(Ai,j))g,h
where 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n− 1, 0 ≤ g, h ≤ m− 1. Then ψ is an injective ring homomor-
phism.
Proof. To check multiplication is preserved we just check that the relevant quan-










































Similarly, for addition, we have
(ψ(A +B))in+g,jn+h = (φ((A +B)i,j))g,h
= (φ(Ai,j) + φ(Bi,j))g,h
= (φ(Ai,j))g,h + (φ(Ai,j))g,h
Finally, ψ(Im) = Imn since φ(1) = Im, so ψ is a ring homomorphism. To
see injectivity, for A,B ∈ Mn(R) suppose ψ(A) = ψ(B). Then for each 0 ≤
i, j ≤ n − 1, 0 ≤ g, h ≤ m − 1 we have φ(Ai,j)g,h = φ(Bi,j)g,h. Therefore
φ(Ai,j) = φ(Bi,j) for each i, j. Since φ is injective, we must have A = B.
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Once we have established that ψ is indeed a ring homomorphism the attack
can just be carried out on ψ applied to the public matrices. The details are
listed below for completeness.
4.1 Extending the Attack
Letting k = mn we have a function L :Mn(R) →Mk2(S) defined by





where each of the indices run from 0 to k−1. Similarly, the function vec defined
as above stacks the columns of a matrix in Mk(R) to give a column vector of
height k2.
We will need to invoke the following two propositions during the attack:
Proposition 1. There is a vector s such that for all Y ∈Mn(R), we have
L(ψ(Y ))s = vec(ψ(Hx1 Y H
x
2 ))
Proposition 2. Suppose some vector u is such that L(Y )u = 0 for Y ∈Mk(S).
Then for all l ∈ N we have L(ψ(H l1Y H
l
2))u = 0.
The proofs are somewhat tedious and similar to those given in [8]; the inter-
ested reader can find them in the appendix.
For the public parameters H1, H2,M, and fixed values of A,B we can cal-
culate









has at least one solution. We can therefore solve this system of linear equations
efficiently, for example by Gaussian elimination, and obtain a solution, say t.




Since the vectors t and s satisfy L(ψ(M))t = L(ψ(M))s and L preserves
addition, setting u = t− s we have, invoking Proposition 2, that

















Therefore L(ψ(B))t = L(ψ(B))s = vec(ψ(Hx1BH
x
2 )), so from public infor-
mation we can recover ψ(Hx1BH
x




= ψ(A) + ψ(Hx1BH
x
2 )
Note that the matrix S is not available from public information, but at no
point is its calculation required. It is merely described to show that the vector
t recovered by the attacker will indeed suffice for recovery of ψ(K).
In general, recovering K from ψ(K) can be done by inverting φ on the n2
blocks of size m×m of ψ(K). This is trivial if there is an explicit description
of φ; as we will see later, this is not necessarily the case.
5 Group Ring Representations
A well-behaved and easily scalable example of non-commutative rings are group
rings of the form R[G], where R is a commutative ring and G is a non-abelian
group. For example, Z7[A5] is used in [1]. We now show that such a ring meets
the conditions required for the above modification of the attack. The following
definitions are taken from [11], to which the reader is referred for more detail.




ag.g : ag ∈ R, g ∈ G}
where the multiplication refers to scalar multiplication4.


























R[G] is a ring that is at the same time a free left R-module with basis G.











Suppose |G| = m. Note that left multiplication by a group element per-
mutes the group, which is the basis of R[G], the R-module of rank m. As a
function, then, this multiplication is an automorphism of the R-module; there
is therefore a function T : G → GL(k,R), where the function Tg has matrix
representation with entries in R, the so-called “left-regular representation” of G
over R. Moreover, one can easily verify that this map is a group homomorphism.
4Technically speaking, the formal sums refer to linear combinations of functions from G to
R. However, once we have defined such functions we usually dispense with them in favour of
the notation above; see [11] for further details.
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To specify the matrices we have to specify a basis; to do this, enumerate the
elements of G arbitrarily. Suppose gigj = gk, then (Tgi)k,j = 1, with all other
entries in the row 0. In this way we can construct the matrices {Tg : g ∈ G}
from a multiplication table of G.
5.1 Mapping to Matrices over a Commutative Ring
We can extend the left-regular representation outlined above to a map







Note that the sum of scaled invertible matrices is not necessarily invertible;
hence, the map is into Mm(R), rather than GL(m,R).
Proposition 3. Suppose R is a commutative ring. We have that φ : R[G] →
Mm(R) is an injective ring homomorphism.
Proof. Clearly φ is an additive homomorphism. To show multiplication is pre-













Preservation of the identity is inherited from the homomorphicity of the
map T . To see that φ is injective, we first show that φ is injective exactly when
the matrices {Tg : g ∈ G} are linearly independent over R. This is because
kerφ = {0} exactly when the only coefficients ag that give
∑
g∈G ag.Tg = 0
are all zero, i.e. when the matrices are linearly independent, and the kernel
is trivial if and only if the map is injective. Suppose for contradiction that
matrices Tgi , Tgj have a 1 in the same place, say the m,nth entry. By the
construction of such matrices given above, this means that for gi 6= gj we have
gigm = gn = gjgm, which is a contradiction, since the action of a group on itself
by left multiplication is faithful. Clearly, this implies the matrices are linearly
independent, and so φ is injective.
We therefore have the required homomorphism φ, from which ψ can be
constructed as in the general case.
5.2 Inverting ψ
We can recover the unique value of K as follows. The mn ×mn matrix ψ(K)
recovered in the above consists of n2 blocks of size m × m, where the i, jth
block is given by φ(Ki,j). We know from the proof of Proposition 3 that the
matrices Tg are a basis of the image of φ, so φ(Ki,j) has unique decomposition
as φ(Ki,j) =
∑
g∈G kg,i,j .Tg. Given the values of Tg, finding this decomposition
amounts to solving m linear equations in m unknowns. By definition of φ we
have Ki,j =
∑
g∈G kg,i,j .g; repeating this procedure for each i, j, we recover K
from ψ(K) in polynomial time.
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6 Conclusions
We again stress that the attack described in this paper effectively bypasses the
security assumption made in [7]. As remarked in [8] this is another example of
some inherent linearity underpinning matrix-based key exchange protocols.
The main limiting factor in the efficiency of this attack is recovering the
vector t by solving (mn)2 linear equations in (mn)2 unknowns. Since solving
n linear equations in n unknowns has a complexity of O(n3), we expect the
time complexity of the attack to be O((mn)6). Should one wish to use a ring
R satisfying the conditions of Theorem 1, therefore, one should ensure that m
is large, where φ : R → Mm(S), and S is a commutative ring. For sufficiently
large values of m the attack becomes infeasible, although the complexity is still
polynomial.
In the case of group rings R[G] this is possible to achieve by increasing the
size of the group G. However, we constructed φ from the left regular repre-
sentation of G over R, where the dimension of the representation and therefore
m is always the size of G. For some groups it might be possible to construct
φ from a faithful representation of lower dimension, so one should use a group
where there is a lower bound on the dimension of a faithful representation; for
example, certain p-groups [12]. This fact was used to counter similar attacks in
[6].
It is an interesting problem to determine for which non-commutative rings
there is no injective homomorphism into matrices over a commutative ring;
such rings would be safe from the attack of [8], and the attack could not be
extended by the methods described in this paper. In some sense, then, the
criteria described in Theorem 1 serve to classify rings into “safe” or “unsafe”
for use with the MAKE protocol.
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Here we detail the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. Since we are now working with matrices over a commu-




































= vec(ψ(Hx1 Y H
x
2 ))jn+i
Therefore L(ψ(Y ))s = vec(ψ(Hx1 Y H
x
2 )).























2 )uhn+g = vec
−1(L(ψ(Y ))u)




































= vec(0) = 0.
since clearly vec(0) is the zero vector height k2, and vec is a bijection.
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